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326 Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate the extent to which local budget composi-
tion reacts to variations in fi scal spending rules. It looks at Italian subnational 
governments and specifi c changes in the institutional framework, implementing a 
difference-in-discontinuities strategy. Results show that when a reduction in cur-
rent spending is imposed, local authorities direct the cuts towards services. Fur-
thermore, when an increase in capital spending is allowed, there is an increase in 
spending on infrastructure and local public debt. 
Keywords: fi scal rules, public spending, difference-in-discontinuities, local gov-
ernments
1 INTRODUCTION
Rules for coordinating the fi nancial relationship among different government lev-
els have the purpose of guaranteeing both macroeconomic stability and fi nancial 
sustainability. Fiscal rules are generally justifi ed because they act as a substitute 
for reputation when government policy is discretionary and time-inconsistent. 
Poterba (1996) compares the “institutional irrelevance view”, where budget rules 
can be circumvented, with the “public choice view”, where fi scal institutions rep-
resent important constraints on the behaviour of political actors, suggesting the 
predominance of the latter. 
The European Stability and Growth Pact, adopted in 1997, is a set of rules de-
signed, among other goals, to ensure sound public fi nances.1 In order to be compli-
ant with the Stability and Growth Pact, member states can implement subnational 
fi scal rules, imposing fi scal discipline on subnational governments. For instance, 
in 1999 the Italian government implemented subnational fi scal rules under the 
so-called Domestic Stability Pact (hereafter DSP) to coordinate and control sub-
national budget balances. In contrast to the attitude to national fi scal rules, there 
has been a controversial debate about the necessity of subnational rules. Authors 
such as Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996), Rodden (2002) and Rodden (2004) 
are in favour of these rules, arguing that the scope for subnational fi scal rules is 
higher when there are severe fi scal imbalances, possibly exacerbated by the de-
centralization process. In fact, when more functions are delegated to local govern-
ments, their spending power rises, and imbalances may worsen. In addition, local 
governments have incentives to free-ride on fi scal discipline because they can rely 
on a common pool of national resources (Weingast, 2009) or they are “too big to 
fail” (Wildasin, 1997). On the other hand, Milesi-Ferretti (2004) argues against 
sub national fi scal rules, suggesting that local rules might lead to “ugly outcomes” 
for local governments, such as creative accounting and window dressing. Ter-
Minassian (2007) affi rms that fi scal rules should only be implemented when fi nan-
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327cial markets and cooperative arrangements across government levels cannot reach 
fi nancial discipline.
Fiscal rules may also be implemented to foster virtuous behaviour. Dovis and 
Kirpalani (2017) investigate whether subnational fi scal rules correct the local 
incentives to over-borrow, due to their expectations of bailouts by central govern-
ments. They suggest that fi scal rules can be welfare-reducing if the reputation of 
the central government is low enough, leading to even more debt accumulation. 
Debrun et al. (2008) suggest that certain rules, such as those targeting the budget 
balance or general government debt, have a signifi cant effect on defi cits, but 
expenditure rules do not by themselves have a signifi cant impact on budget bal-
ances. In a survey of recent studies, Wyplosz (2012) fi nds that fi scal rules are often 
too easily dismissed when they are in confl ict with political goals. However, 
Glaeser (2013) shows that fi scal rules at the local level are more likely to be 
observed than rules at the level of the national government.  Poterba (1994) stud-
ies the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s, pointing out 
that more restrictive state fi scal rules, such as “no-defi cit-carryover” rules and tax 
and expenditure limitations, are linked to faster fi scal adjustment to unexpected 
defi cits. Heinemann, Moessinger and Yeter (2018), using a meta regression analy-
sis on 30 studies, fi nd that there is a consensus that fi scal rules infl uence fi scal 
aggregates, particularly for defi cits but less for debt, expenditures and revenues.
In relation to the compositional consequences of fi scal rules for public budgets, 
Foremny (2014) examines EU15 regional and local governments over the period 
1995-2008. They suggest that subnational fi scal rules are effective in unitary 
countries, specifi cally in limiting defi cits and large debts, while there is no clear 
evidence in federal countries, due to the larger legal fi scal autonomy.  The fact that 
subnational fi scal rules reduce public defi cits is also found by Burret and Feld 
(2018) in the case of Swiss cantons, while Bergman, Hutchison and Jensen (2016) 
show that fi scal rules foster sound public fi nances in a panel of EU countries. 
Grisorio and Prota (2015) study Italian regional administrations over the period 
1996-2008 and show that an increase in fi scal decentralization affects public 
expenditure composition, specifi cally through a reduction in the share of capital to 
total expenditure.
The aim of this paper is to assess empirically the extent to which fi scal spending 
rules are able to affect local behaviour, and for this purpose the specifi c features of 
the DSP allows for implementing a natural-experiment strategy through a differ-
ence-in-discontinuity analysis. More specifi cally, this work targets two main 
research questions: 
 1)  Are fi scal rules able to do what they are supposed to do? If the central gov-
ernment is able to enforce the subnational rules, the answer should be pos-
itive and not really surprising, considering that the legal design is con-
fi rmed. Nevertheless, a positive answer would support the fi nding that 
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328  2)  Are budget items equally affected by fi scal rules? For instance, in the event 
of a budget cut, a local government could decide to focus the budget reduc-
tion not on all budget expenses proportionally, but only on specifi c items. 
The Italian DSP has already attracted the attention of different authors. Patrizii, 
Rapallini and Zito (2006) addressed the ability of subnational governments to 
meet the DSP requirements, whereas Brugnano and Rapallini (2009) evaluate the 
effects of the DSP on local public borrowing requirements from 1999 to 2005. 
Bartolini and Santolini (2009) conduct a panel data analysis on the current expen-
ditures of 246 Italian municipalities to capture the impact of the DSP, showing that 
the introduction of the DSP signifi cantly reduces the level of public spending. 
Other authors focus on the impact of fi scal rules on the ability of local administra-
tions to achieve fi scal discipline and sustainability. In particular, Balduzzi and 
Grembi (2011) check whether the adoption of fi scal rules has been accompanied 
by an increase in window dressing as measured through the level of budget fi scal 
residuals, without fi nding a variation in the level of budget residuals connected to 
the adoption of the DSP. Grembi, Nannicini and Troiano (2016) analyse Italian 
municipalities between 1999 and 2004, implementing a difference-in-discontinu-
ities approach. They show highlight that relaxing fi scal rules increases defi cits and 
lowers taxes, generating a defi cit bias from zero to 2% of the total budget. This 
variation is mainly driven by adjustment on the revenue side. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold, underlined by the two research ques-
tions. Firstly, in relation to the fi rst question and in line with the literature on the 
effectiveness of fi scal rules, it confi rms that fi scal rules are effective. In particular, 
there is evidence that when fi scal rules that impose a reduction in consumption 
and an increase in investment simultaneously, budget expenses react accordingly.
In relation to the second question, results show that: (a) when the fi scal rule im-
poses a reduction in current spending, not all items are equally affected and the 
most penalized is spending on services. This evidence shows that current spend-
ing is composed of different items, and a general rule that imposes a drop in 
spending may affect only a specifi c subcategory. Therefore, policy-makers may 
consider not targeting current spending with fi scal rules in general, but specifi c 
subcategories of current spending in a case in which a certain behaviour from 
local government is required. For instance, the central government could induce 
local authorities to decrease current spending by lowering wage expenses, while 
maintaining the service levels and keeping expenditures constant; (b) when the 
fi scal rule allows for an increase in capital spending, there actually is an increase 
in spending on infrastructure and in local public debt. This result is not surprising 
because of the so-called “golden rule”, which states that debt can be used to 
fi nance only investment. The link between an increase in investment and debt is 
therefore not surprising. However, the increase in public debt could be an un-
wanted outcome that goes beyond the initial willingness of the policy-maker, 
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329but without the intention to increase public debt. In this case, the policy-maker 
could design fi scal rules that directly target subcategories of budget items able to 
foster the desired local behaviour, possibly also limiting the use of debt to fi nance 
investment. 
As the focus is mainly on economic explanatory variables, this study is not related 
to the vast amount of political economy research on local public fi nance.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the norma-
tive framework of local Italian budget rules, while section 3 focuses on the theo-
retical background. Section 4 illustrates the empirical analysis and results and 
section 5 concludes.
2 NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE 
Italian municipalities are subject to the Law for Local Authorities,2 in which the 
goals and duties of local government are stated. Moreover, starting from 1999, the 
central government imposed the DSP to honour commitments taken with Euro-
pean Institutions.3
Since its introduction, the DSP has implemented different types of rules, such as: 
(a) a balanced budget, whereby the total amount of revenue has to be equal to the 
total amount of expenditure; (b) expenditure caps, through which there might be 
ceilings on total current expenditure or specifi c expenditure items; (c) ceilings on 
revenue, which enable the central government to limit local authorities’ ability to 
increase revenue; (d) limits on the stock of debt or the issuance of new loans; (e) 
restrictions on the type of expenditure that can be funded by debt (the so-called 
“golden rule” stating that new loans can fi nance only capital investments); (f) in-
dicators of the ability to service the debt. 
Among Italian municipalities, the amount of consumption (current) compared to 
investment (capital) spending has changed over time. As shown in fi gure 1, the 
overall consumption over GDP of municipalities was 3.96% in 1990, whilst in-
vestment was 2.47%. The distance between these two types of spending decreased 
in the following years: in 2005, consumption and investment over GDP reached 
3.32% and 3.01% respectively. However, from 2006 onwards, whilst consump-
tion remained stable, investment constantly decreased, falling to 1.62% in 2010.4 
2 Law no. 367/2000. In particular, the specific functions are presented by the 167/1996 Presidential Decree 
and cover a wide range of subjects, such as general administration, justice, local police, state education (up to 
primary school and part of secondary school), culture, sport, tourism, local public transportation, urban devel-
opment, social sector, economic development, productive local services.
3 Ambrosanio and Bordignon (2007) discuss the internal application of the European Stability Pact with local 
governments in some selected European countries (i.e. Germany, Belgium, Spain and Italy), showing that 
there is not necessarily a link between decentralisation and financial instability. 
4 This study focuses on the years 2004-2006 and therefore the decline in investment spending after 2007 goes 
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330 FIGURE 1



















Source: Istat, own elaboration.
As stated in the introduction, the Stability and Growth Pact was adopted to ensure 
that EU countries pursue sound public fi nances, also controlling public spending 
at both the central and local level. Different types of public spending are able to 
generate dissimilar effects on the economy. Ganelli and Tervala (2010) state that 
the reallocation of consumption in favour of investment spending might generate 
welfare gains. Acconcia, Corsetti and Simonelli (2014) show that in Italy local 
investment spending on infrastructure has a multiplier of 1.5 on impact and 1.9 in 
the medium term. 
Consequently, there could be an incentive by the central authority to direct local 
spending more towards investment. Is this goal achieved through the domestic 
stability pact? Since its introduction, the pact has been revised yearly. In fact, the 
representatives of local governments bargain each year with the central govern-
ment about the way in which the pact should be designed. On the one hand, there 
are local needs to be addressed and, on the other hand, national and macroeco-
nomic circumstances that the central government has to address. The outcome is 
that since 1999 there have been many changes. During the fi rst years, all local 
governments were subject to the pact, while since 2002 municipalities under a 
certain threshold were exempt and special rules have been applied to the autono-
mous provinces of Trento and Bolzano and to the special-statute regions.5 In the 
fi rst two years of its application (i.e. 1999 and 2000), the Pact required a decrease 
of the aggregate defi cit on a current programmes basis. From 2001 to 2006, the 
rule targeted the budget balance, which has to be corrected from one year to the 
other, also imposing limits, expressed as a ceiling with respect to historical values, 
on the growth rate of current expenditure. 

















































42 (3) 325-345 (2018)
331Interestingly, in 2005 and 2006 the central government devoted specifi c attention 
to local public spending through the DSP. The national government had to control 
the overall growth of general government spending and the Pact was modifi ed, 
imposing a constraint on subnational expenditure, defi ned by a ceiling on the 
spending growth rate. Unlike in the previous period, for the fi rst time the limit also 
included capital spending. Indeed, in 2005, a cap was set on total expenditures, 
which could not be higher than the average spending of the previous three years 
augmented by 11.5%.6 In 2006, the limit on overall spending was removed, while 
different ceilings on current and capital expenditures were added. Consumption 
was penalized, because the rule imposed a cut of 6.5% on current spending, while 
investment could increase by 8.1%.7 Before, the main target rule was based on the 
fi scal gap, 8 while from 2007 the main constraint was on a target balance calcu-
lated on both a cash and an accrual basis. 9 The number of municipalities subject 
to the pact has changed since the introduction of the DSP: during the fi rst two 
years, all municipalities were subject to the DSP, while since 2001 those with 
fewer than 5,000 inhabitants have been exempt.10 
In order to study the effect of fi scal spending rules, the analysis focuses on the 
period 2004-2006, as summarised in table 1, comparing municipalities subject to 
the DSP with those that are exempt. As shown in fi gure 2, from 2005 to 2006, 
municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants (Group B) slightly decreased the 
consumption over investment ratio (from 1.75 to 1.73), while an upward trend is 
found for Group A (from 1.50 to 1.76). This may be due to a budget composition 
effect caused by the DSP.
TABLE 1
Fiscal rules imposed by the Domestic Stability Pact on Italian municipalities 
Municipalities with inhabitants:
Year Up to 5,000 (Group A) More than 5,000 (Group B)
2004 (t1) None Fiscal gap: zero growth
2005 (t2) None Total expenditure cap
2006 (t3) None Consumption and Investment caps
Source: Ministry of Economics and Finance – Financial laws.
6 Further details are shown in the Finance law no. 311, December 30, 2004 and Document of Ministry of Econ-
omy and Finance “Circolare della Ragioneria Generale dello Stato” no. 4, February 8, 2005.
7 Further details are shown in the Finance law no. 266, December 23, 2005 and Document of Ministry of Econ-
omy and Finance “Circolare della Ragioneria Generale dello Stato” no. 8, February 17, 2006.
8 The fiscal gap had to be equal to zero in 1999-2000, while it could grow for a maximum of 3 and 2.5 per cent 
in 2001 and 2002, respectively, and again had to be equal to zero in 2003 and 2004.
9 Giurato and Gastaldi (2009) summarise the evolution of the DSP in Italy and the fiscal items included by 
the different DSPs. For an extensive review of different fiscal rules, see Budina et al. (2012) and Cordes et 
al. (2015). 
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332 FIGURE 2
Level of consumption over investment for municipalities under 5,000 inhabitants 





















Group A Group B
2005
Year
Source: Italian Ministry of the Interior, own elaboration.
This normative framework provides an opportunity to study the extent to which 
fi scal rules can affect budget spending decisions at a local level through a natural 
experiment, as further detailed in the following section.
3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The institutional framework analysed in section 3 shows that decisions related to 
the DSP are made by the central government and are therefore exogenous with 
respect to local dynamics. Considering that municipalities up to 5,000 inhabitants 
(Group A) are not subject to the DSP, they will form the control group, while the 
treated group includes municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants (Group B). 
The treatment is the fi scal rule variation imposed by the DSP and the cut-off is the 
population level at 5,000 inhabitants. 
To assess the causal effect of each fi scal rule (the treatment) on the treated group, 
it is necessary to consider a minimum set of assumptions with which to perform 
the analysis (Angrist and Pischke, 1996). Potential budget outcomes Y are the 
variables of interest and the actual treatment D depends on the variable Z, which 
is equal to 1 when a municipality is assigned to the treatment, while Z=0 when it 
is assigned to the control group. The potential budget outcome of municipality m 
at time t depends on Z and D, which can more formally be expressed as 
Ymt = Ym(Zt , Dt). Therefore, the outcome Ymt(1) is when the municipality is treated 
and Ymt(0) otherwise. The following assumptions should be considered: 
 1)  Stable unit treatment value assumption. The potential outcomes and treat-
ments of unit m are independent of the potential assignment, treatments 
and outcomes of n ≠ m. Consequently, a municipality subject to the treat-

















































42 (3) 325-345 (2018)
333 2)  Non-zero average causal effect of Z on D. The probability of treatment 
must be different between the two groups. Therefore, it is required that 
whoever is assigned to the treatment actually gets the treatment, or at least 
part of the component of the treated group. In other words, some level of 
compliance is necessary. 
 3)  The exclusion restriction should hold. Consequently, the assignment only 
affects the outcome through the treatment. 
 4)  Monotonicity. No one does the opposite of its assignment, regardless what 
the assignment is. Thus, the absence of defi ers is required. Specifi cally, a 
defi er would be a municipality that follows the DSP rules without any for-
mal obligation. 
 5)  Random assignment. All municipalities have the same probability of get-
ting the treatment.
It should be noted that assumption (5) cannot hold due to the fact that the assign-
ment is not random, but rather conditioned to the population level. In this case, a 
sharp regression discontinuity design (SRDD) could be implemented, imposing 
the following assumptions: 
 6)  Assignment to treatment must only depend on observable pre-intervention 
variables (i.e. the population level).
 7)  Identifi cation of the mean treatment effect is only possible at the threshold.
 8)  The continuity of potential outcomes. Limits of the expected values have 
to be identical at the cut-off. In other words, the budget outcomes of mu-
nicipalities just before and after the cut-off level should be equal. 
Under these assumptions, the SRDD can be written as (Angrist and Pischke, 
2008): 
where Pc is the population at the cut-off level, δ represents a small number, Ym and 
Pm are the potential budget outcome and population of municipality m. The esti-
mand of this nonparametric estimation strategy is the average causal effect, 
.
However, assumption (8) raises some issues. In order to identify the causal effect 
at the cut-off point, any discontinuity in the relationship between the outcome of 
interest and the variable determining the treatment status must be fully attributable 
to the treatment itself. However, there is a confounding discontinuity policy at the 
cut-offs, due to a change in the wage level of local politicians. In fact, the two 
groups of municipalities guarantee different wages in relation to the population 
level, with a jump at 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants (exactly at the cut-offs). As 
shown by Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), better-paid politicians are able to 
improve internal effi ciency, sizing down the government. Consequently, there is a 
confounding policy that might alter the identifi cation strategy. To overcome this 
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334 3.1 DIFFERENCE-IN-DISCONTINUITIESThe confounding policy that inhibits the effectiveness of the SRDD strategy is 
constant over the analysed period. In order to remove the constant confounding 
discontinuity (i.e. different wage policies among municipalities), we can combine 
the difference-in-difference strategy with a regression discontinuity design, im-
plementing a difference-in-discontinuities (DiDisc) framework (Grembi, Nanni-
cini and Troiano, 2016).11 The assumptions that should hold are as follows:
 9)  The confounding discontinuity needs to be time invariant. This assumption 
requires that the effect of wage variations on budget outcomes among 
groups not vary with time.
10)  The interaction between the treatment and the confounding discontinuity 
has to be irrelevant. Therefore, different wage policies should not generate 
a different reaction than the fi scal rules introduced by the DSP. 
Under these assumptions, there is an estimator, the DiDisc estimator δ̂0, that iden-
tifi es the local treatment effect δ0:
  (1)
where Ymt is the potential budget outcome for municipality m at time t, Pm is the 
population level, t1 is the year of the treatment and t0 is the previous one. For each 
case, the assignment to the treatment is given by the dummy Dmt which takes the 
value:
  (2)
where Pc is the cut-off level. Having described the DiDisc strategy, we can now 
proceed with the empirical analysis.
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1 DATA
Data related to municipalities’ budgets and population levels are obtained from 
the Ministry of the Interior website.12 Budget values refer to year 2004, 2005 and 
2006, defl ated by the infl ation considering 2006 as the reference year, and divided 
by the population of each municipality to obtain per-capita values. All the budget 
values represent the accrual basis of accounting. Municipalities in provinces and 
regions with “special autonomy” cannot be included in the analysis. In fact, sub-
national governments with “special autonomy” have the power to bargain fi scal 
rules directly with the Central Government. Consequently, municipalities of the 
autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano and the autonomous regions of Sic-
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335ily, Sardinia, Aosta Valley, Trentino-Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia are ex-
cluded from the sample. Presumably, small and large municipalities might exhibit 
different behaviours in terms of budget policies and therefore a specifi c distance 
from the cut-off level (5,000 inhabitants, as detailed in the next subsection) is 
imposed (d = 2,000).13 Consequently, the municipalities included are those 
between 3,000 and 7,000 inhabitants. Summary statistics are reported in table 2.
TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics. Budget items used in the analysis by group, average of the 




Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Revenue side
Taxes 916 199.24 114.70 1.31 2252.18
New loans 916 128.95 246.93 0.00 3744.68
Expenditure side
Current spending – total 916 664.42 221.14 344.79 2780.25
Wages 916 205.57  73.29 58.15 902.95
Services 916 254.79 126.03 7.15 1040.88
Capital spending – total 916 434.80 607.00 3.58 15810.63




Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Revenue side
Taxes 495 204.18 118.19 2.24 1754.92
New loans 495 115.52 183.34 0.00 2529.52
Expenditure side
Current spending – total 495 609.24 232.99 317.67 3349.18
Wages 495 194.07  71.76 76.32 677.60
Services 495 236.77 123.16 21.18 1899.68
Capital spending – total 495 363.59 374.37 10.20 5496.12
Infrastructure 495 285.91 290.17 0.00 5468.95
Notes: In Group A, there are municipalities with a number of inhabitants in the range 3,000-
4,999, while in Group B the range is 5,000-7,000.
13 The Diff-in-disc approach needs comparable groups of municipalities (treated vs. not-treated). It may be 
affirmed that small and large municipalities might have different behaviours in terms of budget policies, there-
fore a specific (and not excessively wide) distance from the cut-off level needs to be imposed. Nevertheless, 
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336 4.2 ECONOMETRIC MODELThe “local linear regression” (LLR) model may be used to estimate the DiDisc 
estimator, as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), which fi ts the data with 
linear regression functions in a specifi c sample range. The interval is limited, con-
sidering a distance d from the cut-off point, thus . The esti-
mated model is: 
  (3)
 
where Ymt is the budget outcome for municipality m at time t,  is the normalized 
population size, with , G being a dummy equal to 1 when a municipal-
ity is part of the treated group and 0 otherwise, t1 is the treatment year. X is a vec-
tor of time-invariant controls (i.e. area size, sea level and geographical macro-
area) and Z is a vector of time-variant controls (i.e. per-capita GDP, infl ation and 
unemployment) at the regional level r.14  and ω are the coeffi cients related to the 
controls, while α0 is the intercept and ε is the error term.15 
The assignment to the treatment is given by the dummy Dmt = Gm t1, as explained 
in the previous subsection. 
4.3 RESULTS
Table 3 shows the main results, where the local treatment effects δ0 are reported 
for the relevant budget items. 
Case A shows no effects due to the variation in the fi scal rule from budget balance 
to total expenditure cap. The latter rule does not affect budget composition (col-
umns 1-3), as expected. In fact, considering that this rule allows for an increase in 
the overall spending, a difference in the budget composition would have been a 
surprise. This result is also confi rmed by the visual. Figure 3 graphically shows 
the difference-in-discontinuities for consumption and investment in Case A (upper 
fi gures). There is no evidence of different trends between the two groups, suggest-
ing that the fi scal rule variation was not able to affect the budget.
Case B studies the variation of the fi scal rule from total expenditure cap to two 
different caps, one specifi c for consumption and a different one for investment. As 
detailed in section 3, the cap on consumption imposes a drop on its spending level, 
while the investment rule allowed for more capital spending. Local governments 
faced two major decisions. Firstly, they had to choose which budget item of cur-
rent spending should be decreased. Secondly, they could decide to increase invest-
ments. Considering that the budget data represent the accrual basis of accounting, 
14 Both time-invariant and time-variant characteristics are obtained from the Italian National Institute of Sta-
tistics (Istat, see: http://www.istat.it/en/). 
15 Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level in order to have a sufficient number of municipal units to 
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337the investment decisions made in a specifi c year are accounted for in the same 
year, even if the investment is not completed. Results (columns 4-6) show that 
consumption decreased by 33.40 euro (column 6), which represents about 3% of 
the total budget. In addition, the current spending item affected is the one related 
to services. On the other hand, capital spending has been signifi cantly increased 
by 114.55 euro per capita (about 8% of the overall budget), mainly due to higher 
infrastructure spending. It should also be noted that there has been an increase in 
new loans of 62.21 euro per capita (about 4% of total budget), in line with the so 
called “golden rule”, which states that new loans can be taken out only to fi nance 
investments. Therefore, it is not surprising that infrastructure spending and new 
loans have the same sign. 
However, the fact that fi scal rules designed to increase investment also lead to an 
increase in debt could be beyond the initial goal of the policy-maker. In fact, a 
higher debt level could be seen as a threat to overall macroeconomic stability, 
specifi cally in a country where the general government debt is already particularly 
high, as in the Italian case.  
TABLE 3
Effects of the Domestic Stability Pact on budget items
Budget item Revenue
Case A Case B
Taxes
-0.50 0.11 0.10 -1.86 -1.34 -1.51
(1.84) (1.78) (1.75) (1.39) (1.41) (1.43)
New loans
-42.03 -43.26 -43.75 62.98** 62.28** 62.21**
(37.06) (36.68) (36.69) (30.93) (30.86) (30.95)
Expenditure
Case A Case B
Current – total
-3.99 -0.76 -0.71 -30.38*** -31.45*** -33.40***
(12.53) (9.89) (9.93) (10.58) (10.94) (10.82)
Wages
-1,66 -2,14 -2.33 4.31* 2.81 2.11
(3.91) (3.58) (3.60) (2.35) (2.56) (2.66)
Services
-10,03 -6,38 -6.37 -22.84*** -22.32*** -22.66***
(7.63) (7.04) (7.05) (6.82) (6.67) (6.75)
Capital – total
25.81 16.70 14.97 126.96** 114.87* 114.55*
(67.11) (65.07) (64.17) (62.97) (64.79) (65.29)
Infrastructure
-21,28 -25,92 -24.30 93.08* 84.21* 84.01*
(36.68) (35.94) (47.55) (48.72) (50.14) (50.06)
Time-invariant 
controls (X) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time-variant 
controls (Z) No No Yes No No Yes
Obs. 2,822 2,822 2,822 2,822 2,822 2,822
Notes: Case A considers t1 and t2 while Case B analyses t2 and t3. The estimations are performed 
implementing a local linear regression method. Values are in euro per capita. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis, clustered at the provincial level. *** (**, *) indicates statis-
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338 Figure 3 gives the visual evidence for Case B (lower fi gures), highlighting a drop in 
consumption and an increase in investment for the treated group (right-hand side of 
fi gures c and d), due to the variation in the DSP rule. Deepening the analysis, fi gure 
4 shows the effect on the specifi c budget items for case B. The lower consumption 
level is generated by a decrease in spending on services, while investment increases 
due to higher infrastructure spending. On the revenue side of the budget, there is 
also an increase on the new loans level with respect to the control group. 
FIGURE 3
Difference-in-discontinuities on consumption and investment spending, Case A 
(t1 and t2) and Case B (t2 and t3)
Population sizePopulation size
InvestmentConsumption
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3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000
  Case B           Case B
Notes: Threshold at 3,000 inhabitants. The central line is an SPA of order 2 and the upper and 
lower lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 
50 inhabitants. On the vertical axis, there are the t0-t1 budget values. Actual population size is 
on the horizontal axis.
It is also worth noticing that a substantial portion of current expenditures (around 
30%) at the local level is absorbed by civil servants’ payrolls (wages). The civil serv-
ants’ payroll is kept out of the target of the DSP in 2005 and 2006 (Gastaldi and Giu-
rato, 2008) and results confi rm that this item did not react to DSP rule variations. 
Considering that current spending is mainly driven by services (around 40%), it is 
not surprising that they reacted signifi cantly to local fi scal rules. More interestingly, 
both services and infrastructure spending variations were already implemented in the 
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339FIGURE 4
Difference-in-discontinuities on wages, services, infrastructure and new debt, 




























3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000
Notes: Threshold at 5,000 inhabitants. The central line is an SPA of order 2 and the upper and 
lower lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 
50 inhabitants. On the vertical axis, there are the t0-t1 budget values. Actual population size is 
on the horizontal axis.
It may seem unlikely that a newly implemented rule is able to affect the budget in 
the following year. However, this study considers accrual data of the budget. This 
approach allows one to consider the moment in which a certain project/budget 
decision is taken (such as a new investment or a budget cut), which may differ 
with the moment in which the payment is made (cash data) or the project is actu-
ally fi nalized. As a consequence, accrual information is better able than cash data, 
to detect budget variations due to changes in fi scal rules.  
4.4 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
Results shown in subsection 4.3 and related to Case B are further analysed, per-
forming a series of robustness checks.16
16 Results have been tested for outliers, trimming values greater than 97.5th percentile. Another check has been 
done considering fixed effects at the regional level. In both cases results still hold (results available upon 
request). Furthermore, a test for the parallel trend assumption has been implemented considering the three 
year of the analysis, 2004-2006. Specifically, given that the fiscal rules’ variation in 2005 is not effective, it 
is possible to test the parallel trend assumption for 2005 using as baseline 2004, and the outcome is that the 
assumption holds. Repeating the test for the years 2005-2006, the outcome is, as expected, that when the fis-
cal rules variations is proven to be effective, the assumption does not hold (Bellucci, Pennacchio and Zazza-
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340 Firstly, a robustness analysis is performed, implementing a different bandwidth, 
therefore varying the parameter d. The Local Linear Regression model used 
imposes a distance from the cut-off point equal to 2,000. The regressions are now 
performed using a distance equal to 1,500 in order to be closer to the cut-off point. 
As shown in columns 1 and 2 of table 4, results are confi rmed. Consumption 
decreases thanks to a decrease in spending on services, while both infrastructure 
spending and new loans increase.
Secondly, the empirical analysis is repeated with a different model, specifi cally 
the spline polynomial approximation (SPA). This approach relaxes the linearity 
assumption of the previous method and uses polynomial functions of order 2 to 
draw the relationship between budget values and the population level. The esti-
mated model is:
 (4)
where the variables and the DiDisc estimator are defi ned as in the LLR method. 
Columns 3 and 4 of table 4 show that the DSP effects are in line with the previous 
fi ndings.
TABLE 4









Taxes -1.57 -1.07 -0.98 -1.33(1.90) (1.93) (2.64) (2.64)
New loans 70.42** 67.70* 77.48* 78.59*(35.16) (35.17) (44.46) (44.42)
Expenditure
Current – total -24.17* -27.33* -24.29 -20.77(13.37) (13.79) (18.70) (17.73)
Wages 6.51** 3.66 3.48 4.81(2.80) (3.23) (4.45) (4.93)
Services -21.44** -21.44** -18.73* -19.08*(8.24) (8.05) (10.78) (10.65)
Capital – total 154.72** 134.62* 156.01* 149.20*(68.98) (70.88) (87.34) (88.65)
Infrastructure 118.53** 102.25* 115.51* 111.83*(52.15) (52.85) (64.02) (64.93)
Controls (X and Z) No Yes No Yes
Obs. 1,976 1,976 2,822 2,822
Notes: Case B refers to municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 inhabitants in the period t2 and 
t3. The estimations are performed implementing a local linear regression (LLR) method with a 
bandwidth (b) equal to 1,500. SPA is the spline polynomial approximation method of order 2 
and the analysis is performed considering municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 inhabitants. 
Values are in euro per capita. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at 
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341Furthermore, it could be affi rmed that mayors of treated municipalities have an 
incentive to manipulate the population size in order to be below the cut-off point 
for DSP exemption. Considering that fi scal rules are decided year by year at 
national level (and generally in the last quarter of the year), the anticipation 
behaviour (i.e. the local government could not counter-react to a decrease in the 
population level) cannot be implemented. In addition, given that moving from 
above to below 5,000 inhabitants would lead to a drop in local government wages 
and that the threshold under which municipalities are exempted by the pact may 
vary, anticipation effects are discouraged. Figure 5 shows the density level in t2, t3, 
and the density variation between the two periods. There is no evidence of a dif-























Population density, difference between 2006 and 2005
3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000
Notes: Threshold at 5,000 inhabitants. The central line is an SPA of order 2 and the upper and 
lower lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 
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342 5 FINAL REMARKS
Coordination rules between state and local government levels are important in 
order to guarantee overall sound public fi nances. In 1999, under the Stability and 
Growth Pact, the Italian government implemented the Domestic Stability Pact to 
coordinate and control subnational public fi nance. This paper studies the effects of 
the Pact’s fi scal rule variations on Italian municipalities’ budget composition, per-
forming a natural experiment through a difference-in-discontinuity design. 
The novelty of this study stems from the analysis of specifi c fi scal rules designed 
to infl uence local public spending, in an attempt to answer two main research ques-
tions: (1) are the newly introduced fi scal rules able to do what they are supposed to 
do? (2) within current and capital spending, is there a budget composition effect? 
In relation to the former, results show that fi scal rules are able to affect budget 
composition signifi cantly. This result may be seen as an unsurprising outcome, 
considering that it confi rms that the central government is able to enforce subna-
tional fi scal rules and therefore the legal design is confi rmed. More interestingly, 
within a specifi c budget category (such as current and capital spending), not all 
items are equally affected. The reduction in current spending leads to a decrease in 
services, while an increase in investment generates higher infrastructure spending. 
The policy implications are twofold. Firstly, fi scal rules are able to do what they 
are supposed to do, but within a specifi c budget category (such as current and 
capital spending) not all items are equally affected. Therefore, if the policy-maker 
is interested in affecting a specifi c item, the fi scal rule should be even more precise 
and directly target that item. Secondly, the fact that fi scal rules designed to in-
crease investment also lead to an increase in debt could go beyond the initial goal 
of the policy-maker. In fact, a higher debt level could be seen as a threat to overall 
macroeconomic stability, specifi cally in a country in which general government 
debt is already particularly high, as in the Italian case. Therefore, the policy-mak-
er may consider a fi scal rule able simultaneously to foster the desired local budget 
behaviour and to limit an increase in public debt.
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